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The False Tagging Theory (FTT) is a neuroanatomical model of belief and doubt processes
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biases of intuitive judgments.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider this statement, “Right now, there is a
killer directly behind you.” Notice your auto-
matic reactions upon understanding the sen-
tence: your heart rate quickened, your pupils
dilated, your hands became sweaty, and you
may have even glanced behind yourself to make
sure the statement was inaccurate (Kahneman,
2011). What is so remarkable about this chain
of events is the implausibility of the accuracy
of the statement. This author has no knowledge
about the circumstances of its readers and the
probability of the accuracy of the statement is
vanishingly small. So why was your immediate,
automatic reaction to consider the statement
above as truthful? Although counterintuitive,
recent social psychological research has revealed
that the initial step of understanding something
is inseparable from believing it (Gilbert, 1991;
Gilbert et al., 1993), and only a secondary psy-
chological act can produce disbelief or doubt
to an idea. The act of understanding cogni-
tions is the act of believing them. In this model,
cognitions are active agents which will produce
cognition-consistent behavior. A secondary psy-
chological process can produce doubt toward
these active cognitions which inhibit cognition-
consistent behavior. The process of cognitive
representation involves an initial belief, and if
there are discrepancies between the initial belief
and other mental representation, doubt can be
retroactively affixed to this belief.
Under this psychological framework, the
False Tagging Theory (FTT; Asp and Tranel,
2012) was developed as a neuroanatomical
model of the belief and doubt processes. The
Frontiers in Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org May 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 86 | 1
Asp et al. Role of doubt in executive functioning
FTT asserts that doubt is a secondary process
False Tagging Theory
A neuroanatomical model of the belief
and doubt processes. The False Tagging
Theory proposes that a unitary
function of the prefrontal cortex is to
“false tag” for various modalities.
Damage to the prefrontal cortex creates
a “doubt deficit” and a tendency toward
belief and credulity.
False tagging
The reductive essence of the
psychological concept of doubt in
cognition and the singular
neuroanatomical function of the
prefrontal cortex in the False Tagging
Theory. The prefrontal cortex affixes
false tags to perceptual and cognitive
representations to negatively bias
distractions, beliefs, judgments, and
decisions.
System 1
The fast, automatic, and associative
process in dual process models of
psychological functioning. System 1
functioning leads to many of the biases
in judgment and decision making in
heuristical psychology.
governed by the prefrontal cortex via affective
“false tags” (Damasio, 1994), which are affixed
to cognitive and perceptual representations in
association cortices in the parietal and tempo-
ral lobes (e.g., the temporal-parietal junction;
TPJ). A key aspect of the model is that “false
tagging” is a singular function that multiple
modalities can access, use, and compete for (Asp
and Tranel, 2012). “False tagging” is a limited
resource which can be taxed during periods
of high cognitive work. For instance, the pre-
frontal cortex is theorized to be critical for “false
tagging” perceptual distractors to keep focused
attention (Desimone, 1996; Coull, 1998) as well
as “false tagging” inaccurate or disadvantageous
cognitive information. When the difficulty to
hold focused attention or make a choice dur-
ing a decision-making scenario increases (e.g.,
by increasing the number of distracting repre-
sentations or response option representations,
respectively), more “false tagging” resource is
consumed. If there is a concurrent requirement
of both “false tagging” to perceptual and cog-
nitive representations, there can be competition
for the “false tagging” resource and the effi-
cacy of each process may be decreased (e.g.,
Gilbert et al., 1993). The FTT aims to recon-
cile several functions frequently attributed to
the prefrontal cortex with the singular resource
of “false tagging”: inhibition, extinction learn-
ing, cognitive switching, memory retrieval mon-
itoring, planning, decision-making, attentional
focusing, and working memory maintenance
(Asp and Tranel, 2012). The prefrontal cor-
tex contributes to these psychological processes
by “false tagging” or doubting automatically
believed representations during the associative
activations that are perpetually occurring in
the mind (see the functions of dual-process
models’ System 1, Stanovich and West, 2000;
Kahneman, 2011). The “false tagging” function
is a specific component of the executive func-
tions described above. The “common executive
functioning” component described by Miyake
and Friedman (2012), which has almost per-
fect overlap with inhibition processes in exec-
utive functioning tests, is theorized to be the
“false tagging” function. However, overall, exec-
utive functions are (1) not specific to prefrontal
cortex functioning (Collette et al., 2006), and
(2) have additional components such as updat-
ing and set-shifting (Miyake and Friedman,
2012) that are independent of the inhibition
or the “common executive functioning” com-
ponent. The theorized prefrontal function of
“false tagging” is only a specific part of the
broader mechanics of an executive function
(see below).
The FTT uses the psychological model of
System 1 to posit three principles critical for
the role of the prefrontal cortex in executive
functioning: (1) Principle of perpetual associa-
tive activations; the mind is constantly activat-
ing representations in an associative manner
toward mental representations of stimuli, rele-
vant goals, other cognitions, and emotions. (2)
Principle of activated representations as beliefs;
the associative activations of representations are
believed in the sense that they will produce
cognitions, emotions, and behaviors that are
consistent with each activation. (3) Principle of
regional segregation of function; the activation
of mental representations are conducted and
stored outside of the prefrontal cortex (primar-
ily in the association cortices of the parietal and
temporal lobes). The prefrontal cortex works
in concert with the parietal and temporal asso-
ciation cortices to doubt or inhibit cognitions
but does not directly store semantic, episodic,
and perceptual mental representations perpet-
ually activated in System 1 itself. System 2, the
rational and slower psychological system, is an
umbrella concept for logical, rule-based, and
abstract processes outside of System 1. The FTT
posits that System 2 arises from the interaction
of the prefrontal cortex’s “false tagging” func-
tion and the associative activations in cortices
outside of the prefrontal cortex. This frame-
work allows for a common prefrontal cortex
mediated “false tagging” function for various
psychological functions (for further explana-
tion of “false tagging” in psychological func-
tioning, please see Asp and Tranel, 2012): (1)
Inhibition; “prepotent” activations of System 1
must be “false tagged” to prevent unwanted
action. (2) Extinction learning; activations of
learned stimulus-outcome representations (that
are no longer associated) must be “false tagged”
to prevent continued action toward the learned
representation. (3) Cognitive switching; activa-
tions of learned stimulus-outcome representa-
tions (that are no longer associated) must be
“false tagged” to allow searching and learning
of a new stimulus-outcome association. Here,
the FTT predicts that the prefrontal cortex is
critical for the inhibition of the old associa-
tion rather than the ability to acquire a new
one. (4) Memory retrieval monitoring; activa-
tions of mental representations during a mem-
ory search that are incorrect must be “false
tagged” to prevent belief in the errant mem-
ory. This perspective assumes that memory
searches associatively activate both subjectively
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correct and incorrect representations (Nadel
and Moscovitch, 1997), which is consistent with
System 1’s associative but imperfect activation
pattern. (5) Planning; activations of poten-
tial action representations that are either inap-
propriate for the context or out of temporal
sequence must be “false tagged” to allow for
appropriate, ideal actions for the context to
be represented. (6) Decision-making; activations
of disadvantageous decision-outcome represen-
tations must be “false tagged” to allow for
advantageous, ideal decision-outcome represen-
tations to be selected. (7) Attentional focusing;
activations of irrelevant stimuli representations
must be “false tagged” to allow for contin-
ued focused attention to a particular mental
representation. The FTT posits that the sole
attentional function of the prefrontal cortex
is to “false tag” (or inhibit) both cognitive
and perceptual distractors. (8) Working mem-
ory maintenance; activations of irrelevant per-
ceptual or cognitive representations during a
delayed memory task must be “false tagged”
to allow for continued maintenance of an item
in working memory. The FTT suggests that
working memory representations are not tem-
porarily stored in the prefrontal cortex (Postle,
2006) but are stored in parietal and tempo-
ral association cortices (Ruchkin et al., 2003).
The prefrontal cortex exclusively “false tags”
or inhibits perceptual or cognitive represen-
tations are irrelevant to the critical memory
representation and actively maintains working
memory by representation filtration. A defining
feature of the FTT is that prefrontal-mediated
selection occurs exclusively via a negative
bias toward inaccurate beliefs, disadvanta-
geous response options, and irrelevant percep-
tions (for a positive bias model of selection,
see Miller and Cohen, 2001). The prefrontal
cortex solely works to eliminate representa-
tions that are not advantageous to the organ-
ism, which allows other representations to be
acted upon.
Note that these executive functions are not
Doubt deficit
A failure to produce normative levels of
doubt for a particular item of
information. In the False Tagging
Theory, doubt is a secondary process
that inhibits information that is already
believed. A doubt deficit will produce
increases in belief to novel information
that is primarily represented.
necessarily mutually exclusive for optimal per-
formance. Optimal cognitive switching involves
the “false tagging” of an old stimulus-outcome
association but it also may critically rely on
“false tagging” irrelevant stimuli on the task or
in the environment (to focus of task demands)
or “false tagging” disadvantageous new alterna-
tive stimulus-outcome associations (in contexts
with multiple options).
Our study, “A neuropsychological test of
belief and doubt: damage to the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) increases credulity
for misleading advertising” (Asp et al., 2012a),
offers some of the first direct empirical evidence
toward the FTT. In our view, the prefrontal cor-
tex affixes “false tags” or doubt markers to cog-
nitive representations; and, therefore, damage
or dysfunction of the prefrontal cortex should
produce decreased doubt that is accompanied
by increased belief to novel external informa-
tion. When given information that many peo-
ple find dubious, such as farfetched claims on
advertised products, individuals with damage to
the prefrontal cortex (specifically the vmPFC),
should fail to doubt the claims thereby creating
increased credulity to them. To investigate this
prediction, we gave patients with vmPFC dam-
age, patients with damage to regions outside of
the vmPFC, and healthy participants a series
of magazine advertisements that were deemed
misleading by the Federal Trade Commission.
We found that vmPFC patients were more cred-
ulous and reported more purchase intention
than the comparison groups even when the
misleading ads contained a disclaimer rebut-
ting the misleading claim (Figure 1). This result
was not due to differences in demographic vari-
ables or general cognitive functioning, such as
intelligence, memory, or reading ability. Rather
the results were specific to the location of the
lesions.
This study extends earlier evidence that pre-
frontal patients are vulnerable to believing get-
rich-quick schemes (Damasio, 1994), religious
dogma (Asp et al., 2012b), self-derived con-
fabulatory statements (Gilboa and Moscovitch,
2002), and statements from individuals in posi-
tions of authority (Berlyne, 1972; Asp et al.,
2012b). In addition, the FTT proposal that pre-
frontal patients have a doubt deficit recasts
older research in new light. For instance, Stuss
et al. (2001) found that prefrontal patients were
markedly suggestible in response to an individ-
ual who was intentionally deceiving them. The
researchers interpreted this result as a failure
of theory of mind. Other investigations sup-
port this finding as prefrontal patients often
are impaired when inferring others’ thoughts,
intentions, and feelings (Leopold et al., 2012).
However, the FTT offers a potential alternative
interpretation as susceptibility to intentional
deception may be conceived as general doubt
deficit regardless of whether there is an agent
producing the deception (Asp et al., 2012a).
Whether a failure to detect deception from a
mindful agent is a product of a general failure
to doubt or a failure to infer intentions (that are
deceptive) is an important question that future
research should address.
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FIGURE 1 | Scatterplot of participants mean credulity and purchase intent toward misleadingly advertised
products. Each point represents an individual participant. Red, blue, and black circles represent patients with
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) damage, brain-damaged comparison patients (BDC), and healthy comparison
participants (normal), respectively. The large triangles represent the overall mean for each group. The y-axis extends
from 1 to 5 with higher values corresponding to an increased intent to purchase the products in the ads and lower
values to decreased purchase intention. The x-axis extends from 1 to 7 with higher values corresponding to
increased belief in the ads (and more credulity) and lower values to increased skepticism. Patients with vmPFC
damage where significantly more credulous to the misleading advertisements than comparison participants and
displayed the highest intent to purchase the advertised products.
CONVERGENT EVIDENCE
EVOLUTIONARY EVIDENCE
From a strictly logistics standpoint, a design
of belief and doubt processes, where “all men-
tal representations are beliefs” and doubt is
retroactive, theoretically, is most adaptive to an
organism (Gilbert, 1991). If belief is construed
as two discrete processes of mental representa-
tion and positive assessment, where cognitions
are first represented and then must undergo
a separate assessment process before they are
believed, the experience of representing, learn-
ing, and behaving would be extremely labori-
ous. A positive assessment would need to be
attached to virtually every representation that
could be acted on or reacted to. Even percep-
tual representations would require an evaluation
to enable the production of relevant behavior.
Thus, this process would consume precious time
and energy as one would need to assess whether
the perceptual representation of a bear running
toward you is in fact an actual bear running
toward you. The perspective of “all mental rep-
resentations are beliefs” avoids the evolutionary
pitfalls of actually assessing everything that is
represented.
In addition, the early evolutionary emer-
gence of meaningful neural communication
likely began by environmental antecedences
directly producing reflex-type behavior with-
out intermediate stages of assessment (Miller,
2009). Later development of inhibition to these
early reflex circuits provided the first “executive”
control and acted as proto-doubting devices in
early neural circuitry (Hawkins et al., 2006). The
FTT posits that these vestiges of early circuitry
remain in human psychology as belief is primary
and automatic whereas doubt is secondary and
retroactive (Gilbert, 1991).
DEVELOPMENTAL EVIDENCE
The FTT suggests that “false tagging” or doubt-
ing (in the cognitive domain) is mediated by the
prefrontal cortex. Individuals that undergo pre-
frontal cortex structural integrity or functional-
ity declines or have underdeveloped prefrontal
cortices should have a general doubt deficit
which produces credulity to external informa-
tion. First, life-span studies have shown that
certain populations have an increased vulner-
ability to belief (Gilbert, 1991; Denburg et al.,
2007). Children are often credulous, and skepti-
cal thinking develops relatively late in childhood
(Pea, 1980; Bruck and Ceci, 1999). Increased
skepticism during early development parallels
maturation in prefrontal cortex functioning
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(Diamond, 2002), as the prefrontal cortex
is relatively underdeveloped early in child-
hood (Dempster, 1992; Giedd et al., 1999;
Klingberg et al., 1999; Sowell et al., 1999).
Certainly, credulity early in development is also
attributable to a lack of basic knowledge, but it
is just this inability to disbelieve without con-
tradictory knowledge that supports the FTT and
the view that initially understanding cognitions
is the act of believing them. The FTT works
on the principle of coherence (Gilbert, 1993),
which states that disbelief results from the com-
parison of discrepant, mutually incompatible
cognitions. A lack of incompatible cognitions in
children leaves cognitions believed rather than
simply represented without belief or disbelief.
The influence of both knowledge and prefrontal
cortex development may play complementary
roles in the maturation of doubt, but for now,
it is the province of future research.
Moreover, the process of early brain and psy-
chological development would favor the “all
mental representations are beliefs” perspective
as it would be disadvantageous and perhaps dis-
astrous if children could easily disbelieve basic
knowledge of the world. If belief and disbe-
lief were symmetrically opposed, good instruc-
tion such as do not swim near the crocodiles
would be less likely to be believed and thus
followed. Disbelieving representations without
initial belief could dramatically slow cognitive
development as knowledge and the relevant
behavior from that knowledge must be learned
at a rapid pace (e.g., Ganger and Brent, 2004).
A design of “primitive” credulity followed by
“acquired” skepticism (Bain, 1859) is the most
adaptive developmental model for belief and
doubt.
At the other end of the lifespan, research has
Uncertainty
A knowledge state of having limited
knowledge to exactly describe a
knowable quantity, a future outcome,
or multiple outcomes. An uncertain
outcome where probability can be
confidently judged is termed risky
uncertainty. An uncertain outcome
where probabilistic or important
information is missing is termed
ambiguous uncertainty.
found that older adults are disproportionally
credulous (Chen and Blanchard-Fields, 2000;
Denburg et al., 2007). This finding has obvi-
ous and direct implications for older persons’
vulnerability to financial fraud (Chen, 2007;
Infogroup/ORC, 2010). When older individ-
uals are given explicitly labeled false infor-
mation, they tend to misremember the false
information as true which influences judg-
ments (Chen and Blanchard-Fields, 2000; Chen,
2002). This finding is not simply due to an
impairment in source memory (Schacter et al.,
1991), although source amnesia is theorized
to result from a failure to “false tag” (Asp
and Tranel, 2012) as increased suggestibility in
older adults is correlated with source memory
(Cohen and Faulkner, 1989). Rather, older peo-
ple tend to misremember false information as
true but show no problems misremembering
true information as false (Chen and Blanchard-
Fields, 2000; Chen, 2002). The unidirectional
nature of the mistakes in belief is consis-
tent with the FTT and suggests that the pro-
cesses of belief and doubt are asymmetrical.
Increased credulity during aging is associated
with declines in prefrontal cortex function-
ing (Denburg et al., 2007); indeed, accord-
ing to the frontal lobe aging hypothesis (West,
1996), there is a disproportionate decline in pre-
frontal cortex structural integrity and function-
ality in old age (Dempster, 1992; Pfefferbaum
et al., 2005). In contrast to early development
however, credulity in older persons cannot be
explained by the lack of knowledge. If any-
thing, older individuals tend to have increased
knowledge and crystallized intelligence relative
to younger individuals (Horn and Cattell, 1967).
Here, age-related declines in ability of the pre-
frontal cortex to doubt provide a compelling
rationale as to why highly knowledgeable and
intelligent older people are often susceptible to
deception and fraud (Figure 2).
NEUROIMAGING EVIDENCE
Neuroimaging studies have confirmed that the
prefrontal cortex is activated when doubt or dis-
belief must be employed. When stimulus con-
ditions indicate an alteration of activated (and
believed) representations, the prefrontal cortex
should be critical toward “false tagging” these
representations. Indeed, the prefrontal cortex
is engaged when learned associations are con-
tradicted (Fletcher et al., 2001), when evalu-
ating data inconsistent with plausible theories
(Fugelsang and Dunbar, 2004), when auto-
matic lexical associations are violated by visual
stimuli (Kerns et al., 2004), when rare events
occur (Braver et al., 2001), when incongruous
visual stimuli are presented (Michelon et al.,
2003), when visual expectations are breached
(Nobre et al., 1999), and when real-world
beliefs are violated by visual illusions (Parris
et al., 2009). Beyond the occurrence of unex-
pected events, activity in the prefrontal cortex
is increased in situations of general uncertainty
and decreased when situations are certain. In
the FTT, uncertainty in outcomes is produced
from multiple options activated in System 1
processing. Theoretically, as the number of acti-
vated responses and outcomes are increased,
prefrontal “false tagging” should be increased
to doubt various disadvantageous options. Task-
related prefrontal activation decreases as the task
becomes more familiar (Raichle et al., 1994;
Grill-Spector et al., 2006; Race et al., 2009) and
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FIGURE 2 | Changes in doubting ability and prefrontal cortex integrity as a function of age. Prefrontal cortex
integrity is defined by white matter organization (Klingberg et al., 1999; Pfefferbaum et al., 2005) and is represented
by the red inverted U. Doubting ability is represented by the blue inverted U. Early prefrontal integrity development is
theorized to track doubting abilities but the initial absence of knowledge representations (which provide discrepant
beliefs to form doubt) suggests a steeper ascending curve for doubting ability as knowledge is gained. Late
prefrontal integrity development is theorized to be tightly coupled to doubting ability as knowledge is not appreciably
diminished in older adults (e.g., Horn and Cattell, 1967).
prefrontal activation increases as tasks become
more difficult (D’Esposito et al., 1998; Nolde
et al., 1998; Menon et al., 2000). In fact, pre-
frontal activation is quite sensitive to uncer-
tainty changes as it tracks trial-by-trial changes
in relative uncertainty during a temporal utility
integration task (Badre et al., 2012).
As alluded to above, “false tagging” is inti-
mately involved in choosing an advantageous
response option during a decision making sce-
nario (Asp and Tranel, 2012). Each choice is
considered a belief representation (“if I choose
X, then I get goal Y”) and prefrontal “false tags”
negatively bias disadvantageous or inappropri-
ate choices. Thus, selecting an advantageous
option involves doubting, and thereby eliminat-
ing, the other disadvantageous options. Indeed,
prefrontal activity is strongly correlated with
increases in the number of response options
(Marsh et al., 2007), the number of alterna-
tive outcomes (Elliott et al., 1999), and with
subjective reports of choice difficulty (Arana
et al., 2003). Further, when the availability of
important probabilistic information regarding a
response option is reduced (as in “ambiguous”
uncertain choices), prefrontal cortex activity is
also increased (Hsu et al., 2005; Huettel et al.,
2006; Levy et al., 2010). Activation of the pre-
frontal cortex is predictive of both identifying
disadvantageous outcomes and the evaluation
of negative losses (Christakou et al., 2009)
suggesting that the prefrontal cortex mediates
behavioral shifting away from disadvantageous
choices.
Taken together, the evidence indicates that
the prefrontal cortex is critical in situations
where expectations are violated, uncertainty is
high, and ambiguity is increased. The FTT
posits a general doubt toward task-relevant
beliefs (i.e., associative activations of System
1) which may encapsulate these diverse find-
ings. However, to this point, the prefrontal
cortex has been considered a unitary region
and the established subdivisions have been
largely neglected. The next section examines the
problem of functional localization in the pre-
frontal cortex and the FTT’s view of functional
subdivisions.
PREFRONTAL FUNCTIONAL LOCALIZATION
A common approach in science is the method
of reductionism, where one attempts to under-
stand complex phenomena by dividing them
into simpler parts and studying their interac-
tions. Investigations of the prefrontal cortex
have proved no different as researchers have
struggled to segregate regions in the prefrontal
cortex based on functionality (e.g., Stuss et al.,
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2002; Van Veen and Carter, 2006). However,
several problems unique to the prefrontal cor-
tex cast doubt regarding this approach as they
challenge the modular view of multiple inde-
pendent functional units, where each subregion
of the prefrontal cortex has distinct and non-
overlapping functional processing.
First, several studies have indicated that
a variety of tasks and phenomena can acti-
vate the same regions in the prefrontal cortex.
Psychological demands as diverse as percep-
tion, response selection, task switching, problem
solving, language, and episodic memory pro-
duce similar activations in the prefrontal cortex
(Duncan and Owen, 2000). A recent review of
neuroimaging studies examining dorsal ante-
rior cingulate cortex (dACC) activation pro-
vides evidence that negative affect, pain, and
cognitive control activate overlapping regions
of the dACC (Shackman et al., 2011). There
are several explanations that could account for
fMRI activation overlap in a single prefrontal
cortex subregion: (1) Different psychological
tasks have the same functional requirement
which is subserved by a single prefrontal cor-
tex subregion that is unique in its functional
properties. Here, the function of the subre-
gion is distinct and non-overlapping with other
prefrontal cortex subregions. Such an explana-
tion is offered by Shackman et al. (2011) as
an attempt to identify a single dACC function,
by suggesting that the dACC uses punishment
information to bias behavior in uncertain sit-
uations. (2) Different psychological tasks have
the same functional requirement which is sub-
served by a prefrontal cortex subregion that
is not unique in its functional properties. The
function of a prefrontal cortex subregion is
not unique and other subregions may provide
the same function in cases of high demand.
This hypothesis is favored by the FTT and may
help account for the plasticity of the prefrontal
cortex following damage (Stuss et al., 1987).
(3) Different psychological tasks have different
functional requirements which are subserved
by a single prefrontal cortex subregion. In this
model, distinct functions are either mediated
by the same neural circuitry at different time
points or differing functions are expressed at
lower, single cell levels (e.g., Gilbert et al., 2010)
which is often lost in large scale neuroimag-
ing analyses. Moreover, other methodological
limitations may contribute to common activa-
tions: (4) Different psychological tasks activate
the same prefrontal subregion because of sim-
ilar task impurities which produce systematic
variance unrelated to the function of interest
(see Miyake and Friedman, 2012). (5) Different
psychological tasks activate the same prefrontal
subregion because of common parallel input
which has stronger correlation with the BOLD
signal than spiking output (Logothetis et al.,
2001; Wilson et al., 2010). Although these alter-
natives have not been systematically investi-
gated, it is clear that a classification of distinct
functions for the putative prefrontal cortex
subregions based on neuroimaging results is
problematic.
Using the methodology of single-unit neu-
ronal recordings, prefrontal cortex neurons have
been shown to be both (1) responsive to dif-
ferent tasks and conditions and (2) adaptable
on the basis of current behavioral concerns
(Asaad et al., 2000; Duncan and Miller, 2002).
As task demands are increased, a greater
amount of prefrontal neurons are recruited
(Duncan and Miller, 2002). The increased
prefrontal neuronal involvement may reflect
either (1) additional distinct functions per-
formed via the prefrontal cortex toward the
task goal or (2) additional resource of the
same function toward the task goal (Asp and
Tranel, 2012). Indeed, this research suggests
the putative subregions of the prefrontal cor-
tex are adaptive and flexible to a variety of
modalities and their associated specific tasks
demands.
Second, different subregions of the prefrontal
cortex can perform a single function. Lesions
to the prefrontal cortex can produce reconfig-
urations of functionality are seen in contrale-
sional homologous regions (Thulborn et al.,
1999; Rosen et al., 2000) suggesting contrale-
sional regional compensation (Stuss et al., 1987;
Voytek et al., 2010). The functional reorgani-
zation may represent either (1) a new func-
tion subserved by the undamaged region or
(2) a modification of an existing function sub-
served by the undamaged region toward a new
modality. However, contralesional prefrontal
compensation can occur on extremely short
time scales as transcranial magnetic stimulation
induced lesions produce compensation imme-
diately after disruption (Lee and D’Esposito,
2012). This suggests that the compensatory pre-
frontal region does not need to “learn” a new
function but can dynamically offer an existing
function to task performance. Beyond the com-
pensation from the contralesional hemisphere,
multiple subregions within a hemisphere have
been implicated in functional compensation of
damage to the prefrontal cortex (e.g., dorsal
lateral PFC, ventral lateral PFC, and anterior
cinguate cortex compensations in working
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memory tasks; Hillary, 2008). However, it is also
true that distinct lesions to the prefrontal cor-
tex can produce selective deficits (e.g., Bechara
et al., 1998; Asp and Tranel, 2012; Glascher
et al., 2012; Tsuchida and Fellows, 2012).
Traditionally, this has been used as evidence
to suggest that a function is both unique to a
prefrontal subregion and unadaptable by other
regions following damage. However, this con-
structs a conflict between a plastic prefrontal
cortex that can reconfigure following damage
and a rigidly divided prefrontal cortex that can-
not. The constraints and conditions that lead to
one outcome over the other should be a primary
aim of future research (Burgess and Robertson,
2002).
The FTT posits a weak equipotentiality
principle for the prefrontal cortex where initial,
Weak equipotentiality
A neurological principle where
low-demand processing is done at
distinct local neural regions but
high-demand processing engages
additional neural regions which may
interfere with orthogonal processes.
Executive system
A theoretical entity which conducts a
host of related cognitive processes
including planning, decision-making,
judgment, and self-perception. The
executive acts to control and manage
other “lower level” cognitive processes.
Homunculus fallacy
A theoretical argument used to
denounce accounts of psychological
processes which are hollow or
redundant, because they attribute an
internal, unspecified device to the
psychological process under
description.
low-demand processing for differing modalities
is done at distinct local regions but as demand
is increased or an orthogonal prefrontal pro-
cess is engaged, additional prefrontal regions
are recruited (see also Miller and Cohen, 2001).
Regional modality inputs and outputs char-
acterize functional distinctions; therefore, the
inputs and outputs of different modalities to
the prefrontal cortex determine what precise
role (or executive function) “false tagging” is
contributing to. For instance, dorsal prefrontal
regions often “false tag” attentional representa-
tions to produce attentional focus and ventral
prefrontal regions often “false tag” cognitive
representations to doubt cognitions. However,
in the FTT this segregation is not exclusive. In
cases of high demand or lesions (with modality
access to other prefrontal regions), “false tag-
ging” from other regions of the prefrontal cortex
can be supplied. Thus, the “normative” segre-
gation of functions is driven by which region
receives the initial information from a partic-
ular modality (e.g., Seeley et al., 2007). We
theorize that the plasticity of prefrontal cortex
function following damage is primarily depen-
dent on the access of different modalities to
undamaged prefrontal regions. Structural white
matter analyses in prefrontal cortex patients
may yield evidence toward this hypothesis as
the prefrontal cortex is both highly (1) inter-
connected (Barbas and Pandya, 1989, 1991)
and (2) connected to parietal and tempo-
ral association cortices (Petrides and Pandya,
2002). In this model the prefrontal cortex per-
forms the singular function of “false tagging,”
a resource for which different modalities can
compete. If the FTT is accurate, a reduction-
ist fractionation of the prefrontal cortex may be
illusory.
PREFRONTAL CORTEX CONTROL
The executive system is a theorized cogni-
tive process that controls and manages other
psychological functions. The functions of the
executive system have been defined as four
related processes: planning, decision-making,
judgment, and self-perception (Tranel et al.,
1994). While the executive system has been
useful as a psychological construct, its appeal
as a quantifiable cognitive/behavior capacity
is suspect (Tranel et al., 1994), and theo-
retically it suffers from the homunculus fal-
lacy, where the very psychological properties
under investigation are explained by an inter-
nal device (Donald, 1991; Allport, 1993). There
is a strong consensus that the prefrontal cor-
tex plays an important role in biasing attention
and behavior in executive functions (Norman
and Shallice, 1986; Hazy et al., 2007)—however,
without a specific mechanism of how the pre-
frontal cortex mediated executive “decides” to
bias attention and behaviors, the concept will
remain homuncular. In addition, a comprehen-
sive account of a circumscribed role for the
prefrontal cortex in all theorized executive func-
tions must be postulated to avoid ragbag effects,
whereby any process not well understood is cat-
egorized under the executive system (Baddeley,
1996). The FTT offers a single function for the
prefrontal cortex, which plays a key, specific role
in the broader executive functions. The three
principles derived from System 1 (perpetual
associative activations, activated representations
as beliefs, and regional segregation) and the
“false tagging” function of the prefrontal cortex
may offer a new view of executive control that is
not as dependent on homuncular concepts.
Activated mental representations in the FTT
are potent and dynamic as they automatically
activate a cascade of other coherent cognitions,
behaviors, facial expressions, autonomic per-
turbations, and emotions (Gilbert, 1993). This
view is in contrast to the traditional computa-
tional perspective where mental representations
are impotent and static; and an additional con-
troller must perform complex operations with
the static representations (e.g., Baddeley, 1996).
The FTT posits that during a situation requiring
an executive function (such as a decisionmaking
scenario) a series of task-relevant cognitions are
elicited from System 1 associative activations.
These activations can be the specific task cogni-
tions (if I choose X, I get Y), but they also can be
other relevant task cognitions (e.g., probabilis-
tic information: I have a 20% chance of getting
Y). When two or more mutually incompatible
representations are activated, a negative somatic
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state is created (Festinger, 1957; Damasio, 1994;
Asp and Tranel, 2012). The established neural
networks associated with the cognitions pro-
duce cognitive inconsistencies that are indexed
on the level of emotions and prediction errors
(Asp and Tranel, 2012). The negative weighting
of each option is determined by the activated
associative characteristics toward each specific
task cognition (e.g., probabilistic information,
affective characteristics, ambiguity information,
and goal attribute information). This negative
somatic state is affixed to the “untrue” or disad-
vantageous option via the prefrontal cortex, and
“untrue” or disadvantageous “false tagging” can
be donemultiple times until no other incompat-
ible representations are found or activated. The
“false tags” are biasing signals toward mental
representations in parietal and temporal asso-
ciation cortices. Thus, the prefrontal mediated
“false tags” produce an inhibition of activated
neural networks for a “disadvantageous” men-
tal representation. The “false tags” decreased
the likelihood of a behavioral response for that
option by its inhibition. “False tags” work on
mental representations outside of the prefrontal
cortex. In the FTT, every potential response
option or incompatible belief does not need
to be represented. In fact, evidence suggests
that individuals often fail to consider alterna-
tive options even in decision-making scenarios
with several obvious options; instead, people
will behave and believe according to the initial
automatic activations of System 1 (Kahneman,
2011). However, when other options are repre-
sented, they are automatically subjected to an
evaluation and potential “false tagging” (for a
description of the automatic and unpredictable
results of this process see Gilbert, 1993). The
choice of representations is strongly biased by
System 1’s activation pattern and strength which
can greatly influence executive functions such
as decision-making without prefrontal cortex
mediation.
This model suggests that the prefrontal cor-
tex is a blind and dumb selector of neural
network “states” that are primed to behave.
The selection is produced by active suppression
of the disadvantageous or “untrue” representa-
tions that are activated. Associative activations
of mental representation that identify discrep-
ancies, discordant information, and negative
characteristics produce the “false tags” of the
prefrontal cortex. The precise description of
how this process occurs is a matter for future
research but the FTT suggests that monoamine-
driven prediction errors play a central role in
the production of “false tags” (Asp and Tranel,
2012). Thismodel does not eliminate homuncu-
lar critiques completely from executive control,
but it does offer a parsimonious account of
prefrontal functioning and highlights remaining
questions for the neural operations underlying
executive functioning.
HEURISTICS AND BIASES IN JUDGMENT
AND DECISION-MAKING
For the last 40 years, psychological research has
seen an explosion of studies examining heuris-
tics, or mental short-cuts, during judgment and
decision-making (Griffin et al., 2001; Gilovich
and Griffin, 2002). This line of research has
shown that individuals will engage in system-
atic heuristics during judgments rather than
“rationally” combining subjective probability
and utility to arrive at an expected utility, which
would provide the optimal outcome (Griffin
et al., 2001). Instead, people reliablymake “intu-
itive” judgments that are not rational but are
based on a series of principles such as repre-
sentativeness, availability, and anchoring-and-
adjustment (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).
Moreover, it is not that individuals preferentially
choose to make judgments with heuristics rather
than a “rational” assessment; rather, heuristical
thinking is natural; it is the fundamental process
by which people arrive at judgments and deci-
sions. Indeed, heuristical thinking is widespread
even under ideal conditions of high motiva-
tion, high ability, and high effort (Griffin et al.,
2001) However, even if heuristical thinking is
indeed a property of the mind (rather than a
choice of it), this still begs the question of why
individuals use a system prone to such biases
and errors. The FTT proposes that heuristical
thinking and its biases stem from the proper-
ties of neural systems and how they interact.
While the “heuristics and biases” program has
invaded theoretical development in many fields
(Gilovich and Griffin, 2002), it has been con-
spicuously absent in neuroanatomical models
of executive functioning (a noteworthy excep-
tion is the explanation of the affective heuristic
by the Somatic Marker Hypothesis, Damasio,
1994). Here, we offer a neural-based hypothesis
for a heuristical process to examine the potential
benefits of the FTT in this domain.
The FTT’s view of all activated cognitions
as beliefs and a doubting “false tag” initi-
ated by a least two discrepant beliefs may
help explain how and why intuitive judg-
ments produce biases. For instance, the FTT
may explain why people use an anchor-and-
adjustment judgment process, where accessi-
ble cognitions strongly influence estimates of
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unknown quantities (Tversky and Kahneman,
1974; Epley and Gilovich, 2001). In the FTT,
anchor effects arise because initial cognitions
from the easily accessible value are believed
(considered true). First, a belief anchored by
accessible knowledge is activated after a judg-
ment stimulus is apprehended (Figure 3A).
Then, a search is conducted by associated acti-
vations of System 1, which will find one of
three primary results relating to the initial belief:
consonant beliefs, no relevant beliefs, or dis-
cordant beliefs (Figure 3B). If consonant beliefs
or no relevant beliefs are found, then the ini-
tial belief is confirmed and reported as accurate
(Figure 3C). The initial belief can only be fal-
sified if discordant beliefs are found during a
search process. If a discordant belief is acti-
vated, the prefrontal cortex can affix a false tag
to the initial belief (Figure 3D). When indi-
viduals have directional certainty knowledge
(Simmons et al., 2010), a new value is searched
for (which is associatively coherent with the old
value), represented, and believed (Figure 3E).
As before, a search process is initiated for this
belief which produces consonant, discordant,
or no relevant beliefs. This process will con-
tinue until no discordant belief is found and
no “false tag” can be attached to the belief
under current scrutiny. Here, merely consider-
ing an anchor increases the plausibility of values
around it (Simmons et al., 2010) because the
initial anchor is truly believed and the nature
of the falsification process is dependent on an
effortful and uncertain search process that is
not guaranteed to find discordant information.
The FTT suggests that the prefrontal cortex
is critical for “doubting” initial anchors which
are automatically believed. If there is limited
time, little motivation, an inadequate search, no
critical discordant information to be found, or
a dysfunctional prefrontal “false tagging” pro-
cess, then estimations should have large anchor
effects (prefrontal patients can produce bizarre
estimations suggesting failed adjustment from
a self-generated anchor, see Shallice and Evans,
1978). Thus, if this hypothesis is proved correct,
a model of potent and believed cognitions with
prefrontal “false tags” has the potential to allevi-
ate homunculus critiques of executive function-
ing and may explain many biases prevalent in
heuristical psychology.
CONCLUSION
Our demonstration that prefrontal patients are
generally credulous to external information
is the first empirical evidence for the FTT
(Asp et al., 2012a). The results have impli-
cations of considerable breadth, from soci-
etal issues such as aging and marketing ethics
to theoretical issues in neuroscience such as
FIGURE 3 | Schematic of False Tagging Theory’s anchor-and-adjustment
process. Bold text represents the stage and italicized text is an example of
a self-generated anchor process (Epley and Gilovich, 2001). Blue arrows
represent System 1 association activation processes, green arrows represent
behavioral output processes, and the red arrow represents false tagging
mediated by the prefrontal cortex. See text for discussion of the various stages
and (A–E) designations. Only activation of discordant beliefs can initiate a false
tag and produce a new belief representation with a larger anchor-estimate gap.
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models of executive function and how heuris-
tics operate in the brain. Our findings sug-
gest a strong asymmetry in the way we arrive
at beliefs and disbeliefs. Beliefs are inherent
in the associative process of thought, while
disbelief is retroactive, difficult, and governed
by a distinct neural process (Gilbert, 1991;
Asp and Tranel, 2012). The evidence suggests
that we are perpetually-moving belief machines
with feeble doubting brakes (Kahneman, 2011).
Initial beliefs often have a stronger influence
than later discrepant beliefs (e.g., Asch, 1946),
which may explain biases such as anchor-
ing effects, halo effects (Kahneman, 2011),
the perseverance effect (Ross et al., 1975),
and the correspondence bias (Gilbert, 1991).
Indeed, while the perspective of the prefrontal
cortex as a “doubter” may offer benefits to
neuroanatomical models of executive func-
tion, it may also suggest a neuroanatomical
rationale for why we often give the “bene-
fit of the doubt” itself: secondary doubt is
simply weaker and less reliable than initial
belief.
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